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Comments
The Fraud On The Market Theory: The Debate
Rages On
For many years, Rule 10b-51 has provided the basis of a claim
for plaintiffs wishing to assert a private right of action to recover
damages allegedly stemming from securities fraud.2 However, when
faced with exceedingly complex cases in recent years, many courts
have suggested that these private claims can be more effectively
adjudicated if the typically large plaintiff class is absolved of the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") provides in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device of contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, section 10, 48 Stat. 891.
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra, provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
13 FR 8183, Dec. 22, 1948, as amended at 16 FR 7928, Aug. 11, 1951.
2. The first instance in which a federal court implied a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
Supreme Court first affirmed this private cause of action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 and n.9 (1971) (citing as an example of an appropriate situation in which to recognize a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 the situation
wherein a party to a transaction withholds material information).

278

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:277

traditional tort duty of proving individual reliance upon the allegedly fraudulent activity of the defendant. The legal doctrine used
by these courts to eliminate individual reliance as an element in a
private 10b-5 action has been termed the "fraud on the market"
theory. It corrects the perceived reliance problem by providing the
plaintiffs with a rebuttable presumption of reliance.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the validity of the fraud on the market theory in Basic, Incorporated v.
Levinson,3 but the Court was unable to reach a majority consensus
on the issue.4 The purpose of this Comment is threefold: (1) to
briefly describe the development of the fraud on the market theory; (2) to analyze the opposing viewpoints presented by the Basic.
Court; and (3) to suggest that an overly broad application of the
fraud on the market theory to securities litigation may well yield
unexpected and undesirable results.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY

The private right of action developed pursuant to Rule 10b-5 is
rooted in the common law of deceit,8 one of the elements of which
is reliance by the plaintiff upon the fraudulent activity of the defendant to the detriment of the plaintiff. Requiring the individual
plaintiff to prove his reliance was workable during the early days
of securities fraud actions wherein the alleged misrepresentations
occurred during direct, face-to-face negotiations.7 However, in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit expanded private Rule 10b-5 actions to encompass a cause of action premised upon an alleged misstatement in a
publicly available document.9 Thus, with the Texas Gulf Sulphur
3. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
4. See infra note 21.
5. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir.), modified
on other grounds, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983).
6. The elements to the common law claim of deceit are: (1) misrepresentation of a
material fact, (2) reliance, (3) causation, and (4) scienter. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-548A (1976); PROSSER & KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§
105-110 (5th ed. 1984).
7. See Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements In Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 435, 439 nn.10-12 (1984).
8. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
9. Id. at 847-48. Judge Waterman noted that "Congress proposed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether
conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges." Id. (emphasis added). See also
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decision, the private 10b-5 claim and the traditional common law
deceit action first began to take on divergent characteristics.
After Texas Gulf Sulphur, 10b-5 plaintiffs began to assert
claims that were not amenable to direct proof of reliance upon the
fraudulent activity of the defendant.1" To overcome this obstacle
in cases involving an affirmative duty to disclose, the United States
Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States" first
approved the use of an objective standard to measure the material2
ity of the nondisclosure in lieu of individual proof of reliance.
Thereby, the Court effectively discarded the traditional subjective
standard of reliance that had proven to be unworkable in the impersonal public securities market.' 3
Coincident with the expansion of Rule 10b-5 was the amendment, in 1966, of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to expand the availability of class actions. 4 As a result of this
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
10. Often, these cases involved multiple parties, see e.g., Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47
F.R.D. 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)(involving 3800 plaintiffs), and alleged fraudulent misstatements made over a period of time. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (involving misrepresentations made from 1946 through 1967). These cases are generally held to fall within the provisions of Rule 10b-5(b). See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-153 (1971).
11. 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1971).
12. Id. at 153-154. The Court specifically referred to the fraud on the market concept
as being applicable to cases "involving primarily a failure to disclose .
[..
[In such cases,]
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material. . . . This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact." Id.
13. Id. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that in cases "involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All
that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material .
I...
Id.
14. Rule 23, governing the certification and maintenance of a class action, provides in
pertinent part:
a) Prerequisites of a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
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amendment, many courts began to consider the class action as an
appropriate judicial format with which to adjudicate claims of
open market investors alleging injury as a result of securities
fraud."6
This desire to utilize the class action was a purely natural reaction given the complexity of the typical modern securities fraud
action involving numerous investor-plaintiffs."6 In addition to the
multitude of plaintiffs in the typical securities fraud case, courts
were sensitive to the reality that many of the shareholders involved
as plaintiffs in these cases were small investors who were otherwise
economically deprived of an avenue of redress if forced to file indi7
vidual suits against the defendants.
Obviously, by its adoption of a revised Rule 23, the Court indicated its desire to utilize the class action as a vehicle for the efficient use of judicial resources. However, in securities fraud litigation resulting from the alleged misrepresentation by the defendant,
the requirement that each individual plaintiff offer proof of reliance caused some courts to hold that these plaintiffs were unable
to successfully certify a class.' 8 In such cases, the courts found that
the individual questions overwhelmed those issues common to the
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. (as amended Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966).
15. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that the class action be the superior mode of adjudication is
satisfied when, in fact, no other method is available); Green v. Wolf Co., 406 F.2d 291, 298
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (holding that the class action is the superior
method by which to adjudicate 10b-5 claims even when separate trials are required to determine the issue of individual reliance); Weiss v. Tenney Corp, 47 F.R.D. 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)(class action is deemed appropriate when it is the only practical method of litigating
complex issues involving comparatively small individual financial outlays). But cf. Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966), wherein the Advisory
Committee on Rule 23 noted that "although showing some common core, a fraud case may
be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there is a material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed." Id at 103. However, as examples of fraud claims deemed to be inappropriate, the
Committee cited two decisions that significantly pre-dated the era of private claims under
Rule lob-5.
16. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Co., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
17. See, e.g., Korn, 456 F.2d at 1214, where the court held that one of the chief goals
of Rule 23 is to provide an avenue of relief for plaintiffs whose small, individual claims
cannot be litigated due to economic constraints. See also In re Memorex Securities Cases,
61 F.R.D. 88, 98-99 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (quoting Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731,
733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom., Drexal & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966)).
18. See Black, supra note 7, at 440 and nn.19-20.
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class.9
In the 1970's, federal courts began to acknowledge that the notion of requiring individual plaintiffs to prove their direct reliance
upon allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations by defendants no
longer comports with modern securities transactions.2 0 Recently,
Justice Blackmun, writing for a plurality of four justices in Basic,2 1
acknowledged the insurmountable hurdle faced by plaintiffs that
are required to individually prove their reliance on the product of
the fraudulent activity. 22 Justice Blackmun noted that "[riequiring
proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed
plaintiff class [would] effectively . . .prevent[] respondents from
proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then
'
would. . .overwhelm[] the common ones. 23
It has been suggested that the Court lacks the authority to reject
reliance altogether as an element to private 10b-5 claims. 24 This
26
argument is based on the language of the Rules Enabling Act
which grants the Court the authority only to prescribe rules governing the procedural aspects of federal civil litigation. Thus, the
argument concludes, if the burden of proving reliance in a private
Rule 10b-5 claim is considered to be a substantive element of the
claim, the Court has no authority to discard that element.
This argument is without merit for two reasons. First, as noted
19. See, e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 55 F.R.D. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (declining to certify a class of shareholders where the individual plaintiffs would be required to
show a causal connection between their investment activity and the allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentation).
20. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), wherein thenAssociate Justice Rehnquist noted that "the typical fact situation in which the classic tort of
misrepresentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial
transactions to which Rule 10b-5 is applicable." Id at 745.
21. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens joined, and in Parts 1,11, and III, dealing with the procedural history of the case
and the materiality of preliminary merger discussions, in which Justices White and
O'Connor joined. As to Part IV, wherein the fraud-on- the-market theory was endorsed,
Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Basic, 108 S.Ct. at 980.
22. Id. at 989.
23. Id.
24. See Black, supra note 7, at 440 n.21.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966) provides in pertinent part that:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions. .... Such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ...
Id. (as last amended Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323).
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by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,26 the private cause of action under Rule 10b-5
is based entirely upon case law and is not derived from congressional expressions. 7 Thus, the Court is free to modify that which it
has created.2 8 Second, in Burlington Northern Railway Company
v. Woods,29 the Court recently defined its rulemaking authority
rather broadly. In Burlington, the Court held that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that may be rationally classified as either substantive or procedural are within the purview of the Court's regulatory
authority and are, therefore, constitutional. Further, even those
rules that undeniably affect substantive rights are constitutional so
long as the interference is merely incidental and the provision is
reasonably necessary to maintain the system of rules.3 1 Therefore,
it seems only logical to infer that the Court has the authority to
modify the elements of private Rule 10b-5 actions in whatever way
26. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
27. Id. at 737. Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist noted that:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in
interpreting it . . . but it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present
state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5. It is therefore proper that we consider
I . . what may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the
portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the
administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.
Id. See also Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977), where the Court
noted that:
[A]lthough we have recognized an implied [private] cause of action under [Rule 10b5] in some circumstances ... we have also recognized that a private cause of action
under the antifraud provisions of the [Securities and Exchange Act or 1934] should
not be implied where it is 'unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes' in adopting the Act.
Id.
28. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749, where the Court stated that "we are dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and which will
have to be judicially delimited one way or the other unless and until Congress addresses the
question." Id.
29. 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987).
30. Id. at 970.
31. Id. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that a broad interpretation of the scope of the Court's authority to exercise its rulemaking power is justified
because:
[T]he study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the
Judicial Conference, and [the] Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be
reported to Congress for a period of review before taking effect . . . give[s] the Rules
presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.
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is necessary to permit these cases to satisfy the requirements gov32
erning the certification of a class of plaintiffs.
In order to overcome the conflict involving whether to require
individual proof or to permit the certification of a class in private
Rule 10b-5 actions, several circuit courts have relaxed the traditional tort law element of reliance."3 Instead, these courts have emphasized the elements of materiality and causation 4 by affording
the plaintiffs a presumption of actual reliance under a concept that
has come to be termed the "fraud on the market" theory.3 5 This
theory is premised upon the pragmatic assumption that, in the efficient, open securities market, the market price of any particular
32. For examples where federal courts did, indeed, discard the requirement of reliance
by the plaintiff, see Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268-1271 (9th Cir. 1979)(expectation of market integrity is sufficient to satisfy any requirement of reliance); Arthur Young &
Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977)(plaintiffs have "no requirements... [to] prove actual reliance on the false and misleading statements alleged in order to establish the liability of any. . .defendant."); Pellman
v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)("[T]he reliance . . . of the named
plaintiffs will not be an issue in the trial of this action and cannot defeat class certification."); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84-85 (M.D. Fla. 1977)(reliance is presumed
after plaintiff proves that defendant's misrepresentation is material); In re United States
Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 41-44 (S.D. Cal. 1975)("It is sufficient to show that there were
... misrepresentations or omissions which were part of a common scheme to manipulate
the price of the stock."); Werfel v. Kramarksy, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)("We
doubt that proof of actual reliance, as in a common law action for deceit, is necessary in a
10b-5 action for damages.").
33. See supra note 6 and accompanying text regarding the elements of the common
law claim of deceit.
34. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that:
[Clausation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by
proof of purchase and of the materiality of [the defendant's] misrepresentations,
without direct proof of reliance. Materiality circumstantially establishes the reliance
of some market traders and hence the inflation in the stock price-when the purchase
is made the causational chain between the defendant's conduct and plaintiff's loss is
sufficiently established to make out a prima facie case.
Id. at 906. See also Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 593 (1975).
35. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 and n.10 (3d Cir. 1986); Harris v.
Union Electric Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 94 (1986); Lipton v.
Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985);
T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc., v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332-1333
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Linds, Thompson, Fairchild, Langworthy, Kohn &
Van Dyke v. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc., 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
469 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102, (1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d
365, 367-368 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom., Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 458 U.S.
1105, judgement vacated and complaint dismissed, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See also Note, The
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1154-56 (1982).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:277

stock is determined by all of the information regarding the company and its business that is made available to the investing public. 3 6 If this underlying assumption is accepted as being valid, then
it logically must follow that any misleading statement regarding a
company or its business that is made available to the market will
necessarily impact the price of the stock for that company as it is
traded on that market.3 1
Moreover, the fraud on the market theory also assumes that the
investing public is entitled to, and in fact does, rely on the integrity of the securities market to establish market prices that are
equal to the value of the securities being traded.38 Succinctly, the
principal underlying the fraud on the market theory is that all investors in the stock of a company will be defrauded by any public
and material misstatement or material omission regarding that
company, including those investors that do not directly rely upon
the misstatement or omission.39 Viewed in this light, the fraud on
the market theory is the practical embodiment of the efficient market concept espoused by many courts and commentators.4 0
THE OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS AS PRESENTED IN

Basic

Recently, in Basic, Incorporated v. Levinson,4 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether reliance is a requisite element to be proven in order to successfully assert a private cause of
action under Rule 10b-5. 42 The six Justices participating in the de36. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 1161. See generally Black, supra note 7, at 439-446 (detailing the development of the fraud on the market theory in the federal court system).
38. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990. See also Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980-81
(1985).
39. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990. Justice Blackmun, quoting from In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980), noted that:
[T]he market is performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by
the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of
the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of
the stock is worth the market price.
Id.
40. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991 n.24; Black, supra note 7, at 437 n.7.
41. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
42. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-99. The officers and directors of Basic, Inc. were engaged
in preliminary discussions regarding a merger with Combustion Engineering, Inc. During the
period of negotiation, the Basic officers made three public statements denying that any negotiations were being entertained. Shortly thereafter, Basic's officers requested that the New
York Stock Exchange suspend trading in Basic securities and a board endorsed merger
agreement between Basic and Combustion Engineering was subsequently announced. Re-
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cision '" unanimously agreed that reliance is, in fact, an indispensible element to such a claim." Therefore, as to the issue of
whether reliance is an element in securities fraud actions, the Basic decision serves as precedential authority that it is, indeed,
required."5
Although the Justices were unanimous in their decision that the
defendant in a Rule 10b-5 action must have the opportunity to rebut any showing of reliance made by the plaintiff,46 they differed
significantly as to the allocation of the burden of proving or disproving such reliance. 7 Unfortunately, the Basic Court failed to
provide the divided circuit courts4 8 with precedential guidance as
to the extent of the burden on the plaintiff to initially prove his
reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentation.4 9 Yet, the discussion offered by Justices Blackmun and White does serve to articulate the two long-standing opposing viewpoints 50 to the burden of
proof issue.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the plurality, 51 first retained the
requirement of reliance as an element of a Rule 10b-5 action.5 2
Next, he advocated adoption of the fraud on the market theory as
the proper method by which to allocate the burden of proving this
spondents in Basic were former shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's first public
denial of the negotiations and before the suspension of trading pursuant to the disclosure of
the merger agreement. They alleged that they suffered financial injuries as a result of trading away their Basic securities at prices that were artificially depressed by the false and
misleading public statements made by the Basic officers and directors. Id at 980-81.
43. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
44. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989 and 993.
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. When a fragmented Supreme Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of at least five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977).
46. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993-94 (White, J., concurring in part).
47. Id. See also supra notes 26 through 32 and accompanying text for the proposition
that the judiciary has the authority to allocate this burden of proof in any reasonable
manner.
48. See supra note 35 and accompanying cases for a listing of those circuits that have
adopted the fraud on the market theory. But cf. Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d
713 (8th Cir. 1978)(rejecting the fraud on the market theory in cases involving newly issued
securities).
49. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. A theory resembling the fraud on the market theory in all but name was first espoused by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d. 891, 906 (1975).
51.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 980.
52. Id. at 989.
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reliance. 3 Referencing the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 54 as quoted by the Court previously in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,5 6 Justice Blackmun held that reliance provides the causal connection between the defendant's injurious conduct and the plaintiff's financial injury.56 However, he also acknowledged that the millions of transactions closed each day on
the modern securities markets bear little resemblance to the faceto-face bargaining upon which the common law of fraud was
57
developed.
Justice Blackmun viewed the fraud on the market theory as an
acceptable method by which to accommodate the unique position
of the investor alleging injury as a result of open market securities
fraud.5 Thus, he accepted the Sixth Circuit's decision to do likewise in the prior proceeding of this case.5 9 According to Justice
Blackmun, the fraud on the market presumption is intended to
preclude the plaintiff from facing the necessity of proving how he
would have acted had the fraudulent activity not occurred." Using
this presumption, a 10b-5 plaintiff will satisfy his burden of prov53. Id. at 990-91.
54. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
55. 425 U.S. 185, 205-06 (1976). Justice Powell quoted the legislative history of § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in support of his holding that § 10(b) is intended to
provide for liability against:
[Any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who induces
transactions in a security by means of false or misleading statements, or who makes a
false or misleading statement in the report of a corporation. . . . [Such person] shall
be liable in damages to those who have bought or sold the security at prices affected
by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the plaintiff to show the
violation or the fact that the statement was false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon to his damage.
Id.
56. Basic, 108 S. Ct at 989 (citing, e.g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,
648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nor, List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)).
57. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989-90. To provide background information to the development of the common law action, Justice Blackmun cited W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 105 at 726 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors note that the majority of
cases leading to the development of the common law of misrepresentation involved misrepresentations made in the course of bargaining. As a result, the authors surmise that the tort
action for misrepresentation has been significantly influenced by the ethics of bargaining
between distrustful adversaries. Id.
58. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990. Justice Blackmun noted that presumptions of this type
are intended to "assist [the] court.., in managing circumstances in which direct proof. ..
is rendered difficult." Id.
59. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986).
60. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153-154 (1972); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982)).
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ing reliance by proving "(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepresentations were material; (3)
that the shares were traded on an efficient market; . . . and (5)
that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepre61
sentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Justice Blackmun was careful to note that "[a]ny showing that
severs the link"62 between the defendant's misrepresentation and
the plaintiff's investment activity will serve to rebut the presumption of reliance. He offered, as examples, two hypothetical factual
circumstances in which the burden of rebuttal would be satisfied
by the defendant in a Rule 10b-5 action." The first involved a situation in which the defendant was able to show that 'market makers' were privy to the truth. Here, the defendant's misrepresentation would not affect the market price because the fraud would not
be transmitted into the market price in the form of investing decisions. 65 The second hypothetical situation provided by Justice
Blackmun described the situation in which the defendant is able to
prove that the plaintiff did not believe, and hence did not rely
upon, the misrepresentation when making his investment decisions.66 Finally, Justice Blackmun offered that the defendant can
rebut the presumption of reliance by showing that the plaintiff did
not rely on the integrity of the market, but instead made investment decisions on the basis of unrelated concerns. 7
As the foundation for his adoption of the fraud on the market
theory, Justice Blackmun noted that, in the modern, high-volume
scenario, the market absorbs all of the available information concerning a corporation and values the corporation's stock on the basis thereof. 68 As to transactions involving such sophisticated markets, the traditional notion of face-to-face bargaining is noticeably
absent. In its place, securities buyers and sellers are obliged to rely
upon the securities prices to be an accurate barometer of the value
61. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992 n.27 (citing Basic, 786 F.2d at 750 and modifying the
necessary elements as espoused by the Sixth Circuit to reflect the Court's holding regarding
materiality).
62. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (providing, e.g., where market integrity is not an element in the decision to
divest stock, the case where an investor sells to avoid potential antitrust actions).
68. Id. at 990 (quoting In re*LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex.
1980), for the proposition that "the market is performing a substantial part of the valuation
process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction.").
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of the securities."9 Therefore, Justice Blackmun noted that actions
arising under Rule 10b-5 must differ from those arising under the
common law tort theories of deceit and misrepresentation. 0 Further, he surmised that the Rule 10b-5 claim is intended to afford
investors a greater degree of protection than does the common law
tenet.71 He found this enhanced protection to be a necessary component of the congressional policy to enhance market integrity
among the investing public through the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.72

In addition, Justice Blackmun found the fraud on the market
theory to be supported by "common sense and probability. '7 He
also acknowledged recent empirical studies 74 confirming the notion
that the market price of a security traded on an efficient market
reflects all publicly available information regarding that security,
including misrepresentations. 75 Finally, he cited support for his
proposition among courts that have addressed the issuee76 as well
as among legal commentators. 7
Justice White's opinion paints a very different picture of the desirability of using the fraud on the market theory in securities
fraud litigation. He concurs with Justice Blackmun's acknowledgment that, if the fraud on the market theory is to be utilized, its
presumption of reliance must be rebuttable. 7 However, he notes
69. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990.
70. Id. at 990 n.22 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 471 U.S. 723, 74445 (1975)).
71. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 n.22 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 388-89 (1983)).
72. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991. Justice Blackmun, quoting from the legislative history of
the 1934 Act, noted that:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a
situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as
artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the
hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets
as indices of real value.
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 991 n.24 (citing In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D.
Tex. 1980), as citing such studies; Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market
Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373, 374-381 and n.1 (1984);
Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 (1982)).
75. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991.
76. Id. at 991 n.25. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 991 n.26.
78. Id. at 993.
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that, in reality, this provision for rebuttal is all but illusory.7 9 Beyond this qualified concurrence, Justice White parts company with
Justice Blackmun on the applicability of the fraud on the market
theory.
As the basis for his rejection of the fraud on the market theory,8 0
Justice White offers two primary reasons. First, he expresses skepticism of the value of economic theory as a guiding force behind
legal analysis.8 1 Second, he believes that the fraud on the market
theory runs counter to the congressional intent as contained in the
legislative history to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.2

Upon addressing the value of economic theory as a guide to the
development of legal doctrine, Justice White was quick to point
out that law relating to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has evolved
83
thus far based on the common law principles of fraud and deceit.
He noted that these common law principals are ones with which
the judiciary is familiar, 4 and that have served the courts to good
advantage as the common law reach of Rule 10b-5 has developed. 8
Justice White would reject the adoption of economic theory to replace these tried and true common law principles because the economic theories are yet unproven.8 6 In addition, he notes that jurists are without the resources with which to test and evaluate the
merits of the economic theories.87 Justice White implies that
judges that are adopting these emerging economic legal theories
are doing so without adequate information with which to measure
their reliability. Moreover, even if the theories were validated beyond question, Justice White feels that the judiciary, in general, is
79. Id. at 996 n.7. Justice White contends that the "rebuttal is virtually impossible in
all but the most extraordinary case," thereby rendering the plurality's rejection of a pure
causation theory virtually meaningless. Id. The basis for this contention is, as Justice White
notes, that the Court will allow "investors to recover who can show little more than that
they sold stock at a lower price than what might have been." Id. at 996. See also Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975), where the Ninth Circuit opined that "we
doubt that a defendant would be able to prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction
that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud." Id.
80. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
81. Id. at 994.
82. Id. at 996. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 994 (citing, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-477
(1977)).
84. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 994.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 995 (citing Easterbrook, Afterward: Knowledge and Answers, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1117, 1118 (1985), as proof that not all economic theories are eventually substantiated).
87. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 994.
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lacking a sufficient familiarity with economic theory to accurately
translate it into legal rules. 8 To fortify his claim that judges are
not well equipped to embrace economic theory as a tool of statutory interpretation, Justice White obliquely refers to decisions by
the courts of appeals and the district courts that he feels the wisdom of time has proven to be imprudent.8
Justice White also rejects the adoption of economic theory as an
unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative process.
Thus, if the reliance requirements contained in Rule 10b-5 must be
relaxed in order to successfully cope with the environment in today's open securities market, Justice White would prefer that the
change come in the form of a congressional amendment to section
10(b).90
The most fundamental difference between Justice White and the
plurality on the applicability of the fraud on the market theory
revolves around whether investors actually rely on market integrity; that is, whether investors rely on the market to provide prices
that are equal to the true value of the securities. 9 ' The plurality
asserted that investors, as a matter of course, rely on this market
integrity when making investment decisions.2 Hence, this notion is
the basis of the plurality holding that investors must be granted a
presumption that they relied on these prices to their detriment as
a result of the defendant's allegedly fraudulent activity.9 3
In contrast, Justice White suggests that securities actually have
no reliable measure of worth other than their market price. 9 How88. Id. Justice White notes that the "efficient-capital-market hypothesis" incorporated
into the fraud on the market theory cannot be sufficiently tested without staff economists.
Id.
89. Id. at 995. Justice White referred to "wrong turns" made by lower courts, but he
declined to provide specific examples. One can presume he was referring to examples such
as Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd en banc, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). This opinion has been criticized for applying the fraud
on the market theory to a situation involving newly issued bonds that had not developed a
reliable trading history. See generally Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory, supra note
35.
90. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 995. Justice White acknowledges that Congress has the resources and expertise to evaluate modern economic theory and the ramifications of its application to civil liability. Id.
91. Id. at 990. Justice Blackmun discusses the typical investor's reliance upon the integrity of the market to establish and maintain fair securities prices. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 996. Justice White notes that "[e]ven if securities had some
'value'-knowable and distinct from the market price of a stock-investors do not always
share the Court's presumption that a stock's price is a 'reflection of [this] value.'" Id.
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ever, even if there were some separate and distinct method by
which securities might be accurately valued, Justice White believes
that the market actually is driven by the opposite of investor reliance upon such prices. Instead, he surmises that investment decisions are routinely made by investors who are betting that the
market price is, in fact, an inaccurate measure of a security's
worth. 5 Therefore, not all losing investors have necessarily fallen
prey to fraudulent activity; 96 many have simply lost their wager.
By protecting all investors with the fraud on the market presumption of reliance, Justice White likens the plurality's approach to
investor insurance.97 If such investor protection is deemed necessary, Justice White believes that it should emanate from
Congress."
Upon examining the legislative history of section 10(b) of the
Act, Justice White believes that Congress is unlikely to embrace
the fraud on the market theory." Because the available history of
section 10(b) is meager, 10 0 Justice White turns to the legislative
history of an analogous section of the Act, section 18, which provides for a private cause of action in certain cases involving misrepresentation. 10 1 The initial draft of this section provided for civil
liability without proof of reliance upon the misrepresentation.1 0
However, Justice White noted that this provision was strongly criticized in congressional hearings because it failed to require a sufficient degree of reliance by the plaintiff in such actions.1 0 3 The resultant provision passed by Congress was perceived as correcting
1 04
this deficiency.
A concern was also expressed by Justice White that the application of the fraud on the market theory will thwart the very purpose
of the congressional policy favoring public disclosure of material
information concerning securities."0 5 He agreed with Justice Black95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. (citing Black, supra note 7, at 455).
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 n.27 (1983)).
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996.
Id.
Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 997 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
102. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997. The provision as initially drafted would have provided
for civil liability by plaintiffs who'alleged only that the price of the security in which they
invested was affected by the misrepresentation.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting the then-Chairman of the House Committee, Sam Rayburn, 78 CoNG.
REc. 7701 (1934)).
105. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992-993. Justice Blackmun in Basic held that the standard of
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mun that this congressional intent is properly applicable to the judicially-created private 10b-5 claim on the basis of stare decisis.'0 e
The underlying principal at stake is the stringent congressional
disclosure policy intended to enable investors to protect themselves by relying upon mandated disclosures." 7
Justice White fears that by affording the investor a blanket protection from securities fraud via application of the fraud on the
market presumption, the investor is no longer required to evaluate
08
the required disclosures when making investment decisions.
Therefore, Justice White believes that the fraud on the market
theory cannot be co-existent with the extensive federal disclosure
policy.10 9 Given that the federal courts must make a choice between encouraging disclosure or adopting the fraud on the market
theory, Justice White contends that Congress' clear preference, a
preference that should be honored by the courts, favors the encouragement of disclosure. 11 0
RECOMMENDED LIMITATIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE FRAUD ON
THE MARKET THEORY

Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will squarely tackle the fraud
on the market issue again in the future. As it currently stands, four
Justices advocate its adoption, two reject it, and three have not yet
spoken."' Thus, the three justices that did not participate in Basic
possess the controlling votes that will eventually spell life or death
for the fraud on the market theory." 2
In the event that a majority of the Justices eventually endorse
materiality as determined in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), was the
proper standard by which to measure the requirements of materiality in securities fraud
litigation. In TSC Industries, the Court, determining the materiality of information contained in proxy- solicitation material, held that information is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." 426 U.S. at 449. See generally Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to
Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old
Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114 (1987).
106. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996 (citing, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
204-06 (1976)). See aLso Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), for a
discussion of the origin of the private cause of action pursuant to Rule 10b-5 of the Act.
107. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997-98 (citing Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir.
1981) (Randall, J., dissenting)).
108. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 21.
112. See supra note 45.
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the application of the fraud on the market theory, they would be
prudent to impose two very clear and very significant limitations
upon its application. One limitation that should be clearly specified is that the fraud on the market theory can only be justified
when it is applied to mature, stable securities that are being traded
on well-developed and impersonal markets.1 1 Justice Blackmun alluded to such a limitation in Basic,"4 but neither specifically limited the application of the fraud on the market to such situations
nor supplied the lower courts with definitional guidance by which
to classify markets as "well-developed" or "efficient." If the fraud
on the market theory is permitted to become law without such delimitation, future occurrences of inconsistent and indefensible decisions such as that resulting in Shores v. Sklar" 5 are nearly
certain.
The other and more significant limitation that should be imposed upon the application of the fraud on the market theory goes
to the very heart of the defendant's allegedly fraudulent activity.
This limitation would prohibit the application of the fraud on the
market theory in cases involving alleged misstatement by the defendant. Rather, the presumption of reliance granted the plaintiff
by the fraud on the market theory should be available only to
plaintiffs alleging that the defendant failed to disclose material information. This limitation simply acknowledges that a plaintiff
who is alleging injury as a result of the defendant's misstatement is
in a diametrically opposing position from the plaintiff alleging nondisclosure of a material fact. In the case of a misstatement, the
plaintiff will likely have little difficulty in proving his reliance upon
the misstatement. Imposing such a burden of proof upon individ113. See supra note 35.
114. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991. Justice Blackmun noted that "the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information. Id. (emphasis
added).
115. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)(investor
recovery possible in case of new issue if investor proves that securities were totally unmarketable). For criticism of this case, see Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory, supra note
35, at 1157-61, wherein the author notes that:
[Blecause most empirical studies of efficient markets have taken place in 'developed'
markets, it is uncertain whether the efficient market hypothesis is available as support for applying the fraud on the market theory to 'undeveloped' markets such as
new offerings, thin markets, and restricted resale markets. Intuition alone certainly
does not suggest that prices would fully reflect all publicly available information in
such markets. . . .Because it is at best uncertain whether undeveloped markets are
efficient, the fraud on the market theory should not be applied to them in any form.
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ual plaintiffs will not prevent the certification of a class of plaintiffs in order to try those issues common to the class.11 In contrast,
a plaintiff alleging that the defendant failed to disclose material
information would face a nearly insurmountable hurdle if required
to prove that he acted as he did only because of the absence of the
17
information at issue, a speculative endeavor at best.1
It is noteworthy that neither Justice Blackmun nor Justice
White made mention of the fundamental difference between cases
involving misstatements and those involving nondisclosure."'
Moreover, Basic involved a factual background centered around
misstatements by corporate directors.1 1 9 Thus, as Justice White derisively rejects the fraud on the market theory as unsubstantiated
and refers to it as a "mere babe" among legal doctrines, 2 ° Justice
Blackmun and the plurality are poised to extend its applicability
to its furthest reaches in one fell swoop. Justice White is understandably reticent to jump on this judicial steamroller that, as he
notes, is likely to have "many adverse, unintended effects as it is
applied and interpreted in the years to come."'' If, one day, a majority of the Court finds it necessary to substantially depart from
the traditional notions of tort liability to adjudicate private 10b-5
actions, a cautious route of departure is certainly in order.' 22
116. The issue of individual reliance may be tried separately without defeating the
certification of a class to adjudicate those issues common to the class. Bifurcated trials have
also been proposed to determine individual damages. Cf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
117. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990. Justice Blackmun recognized the difficulty in the latter
situation. However, he also found a corresponding difficulty in requiring the plaintiff to
prove reliance upon a misstatement. However, in so doing, Justice Blackmun considered
that the plaintiff in such a situation would attempt to prove how he would have acted in the
absence of the misstatement. In reality, the plaintiff would simply prove that he relied upon
the misstatement, a relatively simple, affirmative offer of proof that might well be satisfied
by simply showing that the plaintiff was aware of the statement's existence when he made
his investment decisions. Id. See also Shores V. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 477 (5th Cir.
1981)(Randall, J., dissenting), where Judge Randall noted the "almost insurmountable burden [imposed upon a plaintiff] if he is required to present affirmative evidence that he relied
specifically on the defendant's silence with regard to a material fact." Id. But cf. Black,
supra note 7, at 459 n.148, wherein Black suggests that a plaintiff can credibly testify that
he would have acted differently if he had been told the omitted fact.
118. See supra notes 41 through 110 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 42 for a factual summary of the Basic case.
120. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
121. Id.
122. Indeed, an example of just such an approach can be found in one of the earliest
Supreme Court cases dealing with the presumption of reliance by the plaintiff. In Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1971), the Court specifically referred to the
fraud on the market concept as being applicable to cases "involving primarily a failure to
disclose .... " Id. at 153. See also Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978),
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Moreover, the application of the fraud on the market theory to
cases involving misrepresentation cannot be reconciled with the
congressional purpose underlying securities legislation. These statutory provisions were enacted by Congress to promote the public
disclosure of information in order that investors might rely on
publicly available information when making investment decisions. 123 In cases involving nondisclosure, the application of the
fraud on the market theory will arguably mesh with this congressional policy. In these cases, a judicial policy of granting plaintiffs
a presumption of reliance will serve to place defendants at a disadvantage and will likely encourage them to disclose material
information.
In contrast, the application of the fraud on the market theory
runs directly counter to the congressional policy favoring full disclosure when it is applied to cases involving misrepresentation. In
these cases, the presumption of reliance absolves investors of any
duty to read and rely upon the defendant's disclosures. 2 " The investor protected by this blanket presumption is completely
shielded from loss resulting from careless investing so long as the
defendant misrepresented any material fact.12 6 As such, the fraud
on the market theory takes on the characteristics of investor insurance and will, in fact, dissuade investors from critically analyzing
publicly available information. In addition to protecting careless
investors, the elimination of the investors' duty to examine may
well serve to discourage the revelation of fraud by inquisitive
investors.
Commentators have suggested two reasons for the application of
the fraud on the market theory to cases involving misrepresentation. First, it has been argued that the average investor is unable
to comprehend the publicly available information. 2 6 Second, it has
been suggested that the market so rapidly absorbs the misinformawhere the Fifth Circuit noted that:
[A] general pattern seems to have emerged: where a 10b-5 action alleges defendant
made positive misrepresentations of material information, proof of reliance by the
plaintiff upon the misrepresentation is required. Upon an absence of proof on the
issue, plaintiff loses. On the other hand, where a plaintiff alleges deception by defendant's nondisclosure of material information, the Ute presumption obviates the need
for plaintiff to prove actual reliance on the omitted information.
Id.
123. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory, supra note 35. See also
Black, supra note 7, at 458.
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tion that it is incorporated into the stock price before the average
investor can make an investment decision. 27 Neither of these arguments can withstand closer scrutiny.
The plaintiffs in Basic were surely able to comprehend the public statements made by the defendants wherein the defendants disavowed the existence of ongoing merger negotiations that were, in
fact, underway."2 " If the lack of comprehension argument is to be
accepted as the impetus behind the requirement to grant the
plaintiff a presumption of reliance, it cannot be squared with cases
exhibiting a factual situation similar to Basic. Additionally, the
suggestion that the average investor cannot digest available public
information implies that the congressional policy of full disclosure
is without purpose. Congress was careful to assure the availability
of such information to all investors that they might protect themselves by making informed investment decisions. 129 Thus, Congress
must have presumed that the availability of the information would
be of some benefit to all investors. Even if it is proven that many
"average investors" are truly unable to comprehend the available
information, many of these investors make investment decisions
with the assistance and advice of securities brokers. If a broker is
aware of the publicly available information and relies on it when
developing recommendations for his clients, then the client-investor can successfully prove his own reliance, albeit indirectly, on the
fraudulent misrepresentation.1 0
The second argument for the application of the presumption of
reliance in cases involving misrepresentation contains an even
greater flaw. This argument proposes that the average investor
need not rely upon publicly available information because the market has already digested any misrepresentation and incorporated it
into the stock price. Yet, it has been noted that the bargaining in127. See Black, supra note 7, at 458.
128. See supra note 42.
129. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997. Justice White cites, with approval, Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462, 483 (Randall, J., dissenting), for the proposition that "the federal securities laws
are intended to put investors into a position from which they can help themselves by relying
upon disclosures that others are obligated to make. This system is not furthered by allowing
monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for themselves." Id.
130. See Black, supra note 7, at 458. After acknowledging that such indirect reliance is
possible, Black suggests that:
[R]equiring an investor to testify about a vaguely recalled newspaper article or conversation with his broker may well be a waste of judicial time. When the stock is so
widely traded that information about the corporation is widely disseminated, it may
be appropriate to presume indirect reliance.
Id. at 458-59.
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teraction between the buyers and the sellers, collectively, serves to
force the market to stabilize at fair prices.' The advocates of the
fraud on the market theory propose to retain this bargaining notion while disengorging it of any participation by the average investor. Extrapolating this notion, these same advocates must also
be impliedly suggesting that investment activity by uninformed average investors cannot, of itself, impact security prices. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of such a complex and balanced
interaction that can render true prices regardless of the investment
activity of a major market segment such as the "average investor."
The advocates of the fraud on the market theory hope to ensure
punishment of all parties that engage in securities fraud, whether
that fraud results from intentional misstatements or the nondisclosure of material information. However, it certainly is not the intent
of these advocates to encourage slipshod, opportunistic investment
activity. Yet, as Justice White aptly noted in Basic, many of the
successful plaintiffs invested in Basic stock only after the first of a
series of misstatements by the corporate officers.1 32 These incautious speculators actually profited handsomely from their investment, but yet were awarded damages; damages borne by innocent
shareholders. 133
Thus, the incautious and overly exuberant embrace of the fraud
on the market theory seems likely to prove itself to be as problematic as the situation it is intended to correct. Courts in the future
should recognize the potential problems presented by this novel
theory. They should move cautiously when attempting to utilize it
to correct perceived problems in securities litigation lest they ruefully discover that they have merely traded one set of problems for
another.
Martin J. Stanek

131.
(11th Cir.
132.
133.

Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991 (citing Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)).
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 999.
Id.

